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"I Know One When I See One":
How (Much) Do Hypotheses Differ from Evidence?
The distinction between evidence and hypothesis (or theory) appears to be a fundamental one in
scientific reasoning (e.g., Kuhn, 1989). Researchers commonly suggest that it is desirable for
children, and lay people (and perhaps even some scientists) to improve their understanding of this
distinction. Our own simulations with the ECHO model (e.g., Ranney, Schank, Mosmann, &
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INTRODUCTION
How is it that context, as well as one's training, experience, and knowledge, affect the act of
classifying an entity? Answering this question, as well as examining intra- and inter-classifier
consistencies, are crucial- for one example - to assessing the stability of indexing in searches
through databases and catalogs. We approach these topics from the "cognitive science of science"
perspective, by examining the nature of essential categorizations in critical inquiry - in particular,
the classification of statements as either evidence or hypotheses.
Many discussions of (e.g., "scientific") reasoning highlight the classification of propositions into
hypotheses (or "theory") and pieces of evidence (or "data"). Distinguishing between these belief
categories is portrayed as a crucial prerequisite in developing critical thinking. In studying the
principles of explanatory coherence and assessing our "reasoner's workbench" (Convince Me), we
find that the hypothesis/evidence distinction is nonobvious to undergraduates ("novices"). For
instance, for isolated propositions, only zero-to-moderate (absolute) correlations were observed
among "evidence-likeness," "hypothesis-likeness," and believability ratings. Inter-rater reliabilities
for the evidence and hypothesis notions were also fairly low. Providing textual context for the
beliefs, though, generally yielded higher discriminability and reliability (regarding hypothesis and
evidence) across subjects - even for experts who study reasoning professionally. While training
novices with Convince Me and its curriculum lends sophistication to these subjects' discriminative
criteria, crisp classificatory delineations between hypotheses and evidence are still absent. Most
disconcerting are findings that even experts have surprisingly low agreement when rating (a) a
proposition's hypothesis-likeness or evidence-likeness, and (b) the goodness of novices' definitions
of "evidence" and "hypothesis." These results are discussed regarding explanatory coherence, the
associated ECHO model, Convince Me, and subjects' believability ratings. In sum, hypotheses and
evidence may be closer to each other than we generally care to admit
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We might expect that average ratings of evidence-likeness and hypothesis-likeness are (or should
be) negatively correlated; this distinction would reflect differences in their relative controversy,
contestability, reliability, and perceptibility. Further, since TEC's data priority should lend
activation (ECHO's currency of believability) more to evidence than to hypotheses, believability
should also be - again, on average - negatively correlated with hypotheses, while positively
correlated with evidence. Anotherreason for expecting negative correlations involving hypotheses
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Montoya, 1993; Schank & Ranney, 1991), based upon the principles of the Theory of Explanatory
Coherence (TEC; e.g., Ranney & Thagard, 1988; Thagard, 1989, 1992) also rely on the eVidenc~/
hypothesis contrast (as do other studies that have assessed principles of explanatory coherence, cf.
Read & Marcus-Newhall, 1993). For instance, TEC includes the principle of data priority, which
essentially holds that a piece of evidence is more acceptable than a mere hypothesis, all other
things being equal. ECHO reifies this principle by linking connectionist nodes that represent
evidence directly to the model's source of activation; in contrast, nodes representing hypotheses in·.
ECHO are only indirectly linked to the activational source. Most (and especially empirical)
researchers - including ourselves - have implied that the distinction is either easy to make, or
that at least skilled scientists make it fairly well (cf. Giere, 1991). Definitions in science books
often suggest the fonner, as if context does not have a major impact on the epistemic
categorization. As Hanson (1958/1965) and other philosophers have pointed out, though, the
observation/theory classification may not be clear-cut. Toward the end of his book, Hanson wrote:
"...we have tried to explore the geography of some dimly-lit passages along which physicists have
moved from surprising, anomalous data to a theory which might explain those data. We have
discussed obstacles which litter these passages. They are rarely of a direct observational or
experimental variety, but always reveal conceptual elements. The observations and the
experiments are infused with the concepts; they are loaded with the theories." One might compare
such an approach to Popper's (1978) whose answer to the chicken-and-egg question of "Which
came first, evidence or hypothesis?" was: "an earlier kind of hypothesis" - by which he explains
that humans never engage in theory-free observations, although their theories may of course
undergo revision as a result of new evidence (also cf. Tweney, Doherty, & Mynatt, 1981).
Little controlled experimental work on this issue, aside from that offered here, exists. The present
study draws upon (a) our past empirical insights into how syntax and word choice can bias the
evidencejhypothesis classification (e.g., Schank & Ranney, 1991) and (b) issues addressed while
designing our "reasoner's workbench" software, Convince Me, which considers evidence to be
variably reliable - and hence variably worthy of the full computational effects ofdata priority (see
Ranney, in press; Schank & Ranney, 1993, etc.). We consider several questions regarding the
hypothesis/evidence distinction: First, how are particular individual propositions classified? This
is addressed by observing how subjects rate the "hypothesis-likeness," "evidence-likeness," and
"believability" of a corpus of scientific statements. Second, how does context seem to affect these
classifications? To address this, we provide statements either in isolation or within a textual, story-
type, context. Third, how do experts in scientific reasoning differ from untrained novices in
classifying these statements? In addressing this question, we compare samples of the two
populations of subjects, focusing on both their inter-construct relationships and inter-subject
agreement. Finally, how accurate and useful are definitions of "hypothesis," "theory," "evidence,"
"fact," and other such constructs? For this question, we asked our novices to define the set of terms,
and asked our experts to grade the goodness/accuracy of these novices' definitions.
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stems from the many situations in which one has more than two (perhaps implicit) alternate
hypotheses that cover the same scope (e.g., several competing ideas about dinosaur extinction),
although only one is likely to be correct. Hence, most of one's hypotheses are likely to have low
believability, while most of one's evidential propositions should have higher believability, due to
data priority and the relatively fewer inhibitory relations - such as competitions and
contradictions - associated with evidence. This pattern is certainly in concert with what we have
observed in past studies (e.g., Schank & Ranney, 1991; see Discussion).
Design and General Procedure
As shown in Figure 1, the novices completed a pre-test, three curriculum units on scientific
reasoning, integrative exercises using the Convince Me software (for generating and analyzing
arguments; Ranney, in press; Ranney et al., 1993; Schank & Ranney, 1993), and a post-test (which
replaces some pre-test items with new isomorphic items). One subgroup of ("propositional")
experts was asked to complete the proposition-rating portions of the pre-test (see below). The other
subgroup of ("definitional") experts was given a randomly-ordered booklet of novices' completed
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......~ ~Ipropositional ratings I and/or novices' definitions rated by experts
Pretest: definitions,
..
Curriculum ~ Integrative ~ Posttest .propositional ratings, units 1, 2, & 3. exercises with (isomorphic to
proposition generation, CONVINCE ME pre-test)
identification, & relation ...... ..
...... ..
.. ..
EXPERTS:
NOVICES:
Figure 1. Summary of this experiment's method.
METHOD
Subjects
Twenty subjects participated in this study. Ten subjects were undergraduate novices (four women
and six men) from the University of California, Berkeley. They responded to campus
advertisements and were paid five dollars per hour for their participation. Their backgrounds were
varied, but they had essentially no background in logic or the philosophy of science. The ten expert
subjects were volunteers from the University of Chicago, the University of California (Berkeley),
Princeton University, the Tennessee Institute of Technology, and the Educational Testing Service.
(Five subjects were post-Ph.D., and five were doctoral students; three subjects were women, and
seven were men.) The experts had experience in cognitive science, the philosophy of science,
science education, and logic; and each is currently studying scientific and practical reasoning. Nine
experts provided propositional (statement) ratings, and five experts provided goodness ratings of
novices' scientific definitions. (Four experts provided both propositional and definitional ratings.)
Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994
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a) All wine is made from grapes.
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Materials, Apparatus, and Specific Procedures
.Pre-test (approximately 90 minutes). The pre-test assesses one's ability to classify
hypotheses and evidence, evaluate scientific theories, and generate and disconfirm alternate
hypotheses (using tasks that include some related to those of Wason, 1968, and Wason & Johnson~
Laird, 1972). Subjects are further asked to (a) define hypothesis, evidence, fact, explanation,
contradiction, theory, argument, confirmation bias, disconfirmation, recency bias, and primacy
bias, (b) rate statements presented in isolation (see Table 1) or within a story context (see Table 2)
on a 1-9 scale, in terms of their believability, and as exemplars of hypothesis and evidence (Le., in
the way that one would search for prototypical hypotheses and evidence; cf. Rosch, 1977),
definitions from the pre- and post-tests (see (a) below), and were asked to score them on a scale
from 1 (poor) to 3 (good) for each given definition.
why (explain) : . _
All· wine is made from grapes.
Gravity exists in other galaxies.
President John F. Kennedy was assassinated.
Abraham Lincoln said that Ross Perot would lose in 1992.
Birds evolved from animals that lived in trees.
Rating instructions:
Table 1. Rating instructions and examples of isolated propositions.
Based on your view and knowledge of the world, for each of the following statements please:
1. Rate (circle) how good an example of a hypothesis you think the statement is,
2. Rate (circle) how good an example of a piece of evidence you think the statement is,
3. Explain, (briefly, in writing) why you gave the hypothesis and evidence ratings you did, and
4. Rate (c~rcle) how strongly you believe the statement.
Some examples of the isolated propositions, available for rating:
Propositional rating example:
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Examples of propositions from the above context, made available for rating:
Table i. Propositions embedded within a story context.
,1
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(c) generate hypotheses, attempt disconfirmations, and offer data regarding given situations, and
(d) identify (and give believability ratings for) hypotheses and evidence in a given passage,
propose (and rate) alternative propositions, state which propositions explain and contradict which
others, and make any revisions to their argument and ratings.
Some dogs have an aggressive disorder. They bark more than other dogs, growl
at strangers, and sometimes even bite. They also tend to have higher blood pressure
and heart rate than other dogs.
Some researchers think that these dogs get the aggressive disorder when their
owners treat them poorly, that is, when the owner n~glects the dog, doesn't g.ive it
enough love, or hits it. These researchers trained one group of aggressive-disorder
dog owners to treat their dogs firmly yet lovingly. They found that all dogs whose
owners were trained barked much less, were much friendlier to strangers, never bit a
stranger, and had lower heart rate and blood pressure than dogs whose owners had not
been trained. These researchers said that their experiment proved that abuse causes
dogs to have the disorder. .
Other researchers disagree. They think that dogs with the disorder are born
without a certain chemical in their body. They think that the lack of this chemical
elevates their blood pressure and causes the disorder. These researchers gave one
group of aggressive-disorder dogs a medicine that contained the chemical. They
found that the dogs had a much lower heart rate and blood pressure, were friendlier
to strangers, did not bark as much, and never bit anyone. These researchers said
that their experiment proved that the missing chemical causes dogs to have the
disorder.
Some dogs have an aggressive disorder.
Some researchers think dogs get an aggressive disorder when their owners treat them
, poorly.
Abuse causes an aggressive disorder in dogs.
Some researchers found that a chemical relieved symptoms of aggressive disorder in
dogs.
Curriculum units (approximately one hour each, three hours total). Unit 1, "Evidence,
Hypotheses, and Theories," is designed to help students (a) classify hypotheses and evidence, '(b)
generate and relate these to create "explanatory theories" - including justifications, and (c)
evaluate the believability of the considered propositions. Unit 2, "Reasoning About Arguments,"
is primarily designed to help students generate alternative hypotheses and attempt to disconfirm
them, all while reducing common biases (e.g., as observed in Ranney et al., 1993). Unit 3, "Using
Convince Me," describes how to use this software to enter, save, and evaluate arguments. In
particular, it explains to the student how to (1) input their own situational beliefs, (2) classify them
as hypotheses or evidence, (3) indicate which beliefs explain or contradict which others, (4) rate
their beliefs' plausibilities, (5) run the ECHO simulation to predict which beliefs "should" be
accepted or rejected, based on their argument's structure, (6) contrast their ratings with ECHO's
predictions, and (7) modify ECHO's parameters to better model their individual reasoning style, if
they so desire. Throughout the curriculum, subjects are also encouraged to modify their arguments
or ratings as needed.
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Your statement:
Step.:
H2
E2
~...T
I
1
144
( Explain... ) ( Explain All... ) (
-0
H1. To make Ice cubes freeze faster, use hot water, nol cold w .0-
H2. To make Ice cubes freeze faster, use COld wate
H3. Water in the freezer should behave the same way as obj
H otheses:
Ranney, Schank, Hoadley &Neff
8 7.3 E1. The hotter something is, the longer ~ takes ~ to cool to
7 7 E2. Latisha's Mom found that hot water did freeze faster
5 6.7
6 4
7 5.5
---Ratings-
You ECHO
You ECHO Evidence:
Explanations:
The correlation between your ratlngs and
ECHO's eualuations is: 0.34 (mildly related).
The three most disparately rated statements
are: H2, H1, H3, respectiuely (see boldened
stotemcnts).
'More of the hot water evaporat&s so there's less mass to freezej
(Add... ) ( Edit ... )( Oelele ) ( Rate... )( Rate Alt. .. )( Mooers fit ... ) Graph and simulation results:
Figure 2. A subject adds and classifies a belief about the speeds at which water of different
initial temperatures freezes (bottom right) in response to Convince Me's feedback (bottom left).
(Note that subjects in this study used an earlier version of the software which did not
graphically display the argument structure-as shown in the upper right; rather, "activational
thermometer'l icons were merely displayed in rows and columns.)
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Check all that apply:
o Rcknowledged fact or stotJstlc
o Obseruation or memory
t2I One possible Inference, opinion, or uiew
o Some reasonable people might disagree
Select one:
o Euldence IE3 IReliability, If euldence7 D:==== (from t , poor, to 3, good)
@ Hypothesis IH4 I
n OK B( Cancel)
1. Enter hypothestls and~ - , evidence.H3. Water in the freezer should behave the same way as objects cooling to c>
room temperature"AND" 2. Enter explanations and
E1. The hotter somethi Is the 10 er it takes it to cool to room IrH_e_I~P/_M_e_._••~g:...I_._:-~"A1I contradictions.P-!Ex=.Jpl.:.la~in~(S~)~W.u:h~Y..2:~"~H~2.~T:!'::0:W2;ml.!.a!.:lke~lc~et:::c':"u:':"be~S:::::f:'::ree:'::z~e=fa::':st:::'e':'::r,:':::u~s:"e-c-o"":"ld-:-w-a-te.L.r,~ 3. Rate the believability of
not hot water" your statements.
4. Run the ECHO
Contradictions: simulation.I":=====~':::===:::::~====~======r.~ L-------.J.-o~ 5. Compare your evaluationsH1. To make Ice cubes freeze faster, use hot water, not cold water Current Fill: to ECHO's.
1L..---------~-_:_---__:'----'""':"'7-~~ Ir,;;.;;.;.:.;;.;;~~:.-..---.,I 6. (optional) Make changes to
Confllct(s) with: "H2. To make Ice cubes freeze faster, use cold water, your argument
not hot water"
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RESULTS
As shown below, context and training generally improved subjects' hypothesis/evidence
classifications, yet even experts found them difficult:
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Post-test (approximately 90 minutes). The post-test is similar to the pre-test, and again
assesses one's ability to classify hypotheses and evidence, generate and disconfirm alternate
hypotheses, and evaluate scientific theories (see "Pre-test" description above). Three sets of items
on the post-test were identical to those on the pre-test (the definitions, and both the isolated and
contextualized statements available for rating; (see (a) and (b) under "Pre-test" above). Four sets
of items were isomorphic to those on the pre-test (involving hypothesis generation and
disconfirmation, as well as the identification of evidence, hypotheses, explanations, and
contradictions from a given passage, etc.; see (c) and (d) under "Pre-test").
Exit questionnaire (approximately 10 minutes). The exit questionnaire asks subjects to (a)
rate and describe how much they learned from the software, exercises, tests, and each of the
curriculum units, and (b) describe what they liked most and least about the software, exercises, and
curriculum - and offer any suggestions for how to improve them. Subjects are given copies of the
curriculum units to refer back to while completing the questionnaire.
Convince Me and integrative exercises (approximately two hours). Convince Me elicits
argument structures, each of which includes multiple theories, hypotheses, and pieces of evidence.
After generating such an argument and offering believability ratings for one's elicited propositions,
a student invokes Convince Me's reasoning engine, ECHO, to obtain feedback on how well the
student's structure seems to match his/her beliefs (as shown in Figure 2). Students may respond to
this feedback by re-evaluating their beliefs, reformulating their arguments, or adjusting the ECHO
model to better simulate their thinking (Ranney, Schank, & Diehl, in press). Subjects using
Convince Me are given a set of integrative exercises, and are asked to both enter their arguments
into the system and run the ECHO simulation. Convince Me runs using HyperCard (with external
C commands) on a Macintosh with a 13" (Powerbook-size) or 17" (two-page) monitor (Schank,
Ranney, & Hoadley, 1994).
Propositional Ratings
Correlations among the constructs ofevidence, hypothesis, and believability. As Table 3
illustrates, context generally adds to the discriminability between evidence and hypotheses across
all types of subjects and times of testing. Even experts, who exhibited a statistically significant
negative correlation (-.28) for no-context propositions, improved the magnitude of their evidence-
hypothesis distinction in context to r = -.66 (all p's < .05 unless otherwise noted).
Without a context, novices initially show no significant correlation between evidence and
hypothesis (r =-.03), but training (-.30), context (-,41), and both factors together (-.63)
significantly increase the absolute value of the observed (anti-)correlation. The novices also
showed a similar pattern ofresults with respect to their believability-hypothesis distinction, with a
nonsignificantly positive correlation (r = .09) becoming highly and significantly negative (-.68) due
to context and training with Convince Me. Furthermore, training played a role in significantly
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ar:f:. 0, p<.05; bsignificantly different from novice's pretest, p<.05; Csignificantly different from no-context, p<.OS
H-H
.28a
-.66abc
----Experts:---
E-H
-.28a
-.19b
----Experts:----
E-E
.2oa
-.04bc
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Inter-rater agreement regarding the constructs ofevidence, hypothesis, and believability.
As shown in Table 4, both groups showed greater inter-rater reliability (correlations) across their
Table 3. Within-subjects correlations between believability and hypothesis-likeness (B-H),
evidence-likeness and hypothesis-likeness (E-H), and believability and evidence-likeness (B-E).
increasing the novices' initial (and significant) in-context believability-evidence correlation from
.42 to .64.
Training generally made novices behave more like experts. Experts exhibited negative evidence-
hypothesis correlations (-.28 out of context and -.66 in context), and novices achieved these levels
during post-testing (-.30 out of context and -.63 in context, vs. -.03 and -.30 during their pre-test).
Further, novices eventually approximated the experts' negative believability-hypothesis cOITelaticm
for no-context propositions (-.14 vs. -.24). While novices' believability-hypothesis correlations
were more negative than experts' in context (-.57 and -.68 vs. -.19), in general, both groups had
fairly positivistic stances, as believability-evidence correlations ranged from .35 to .64 across
subjects, context-types, and testing times. (Nb. that, after training, novices exhibited the largest of
the believability-evidence correlations.)
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ar :f:. 0, p<.05; bsignificantly different from novice's pretest, p<.OS; Csignificantly different from no-context, p<.05 -
----Novices,----
B-H E-H B-E
No context: pretest .09 -.03 .48a
post-test -.14 -.30a .60a
In context: pretest -.57ac -.41ac .42a
post-test -.68ac -.63abc .64ab
Table 4. Between-subjects correlations regarding believability (B-B), evidence-likeness (E-E),
and hypothesis-likeness (H-H).
----Novices,----
B-B E-E H-H
No context: pretest .66a .31a .15a
post-test .6Sa .32a .06
In context: pretest .20ac .23a .29ac
post-test .2Sac .44ab .39ac
Ranney, M. (1994). "I Know One When I See One": How (Much) Do Hypotheses Differ from Evidence?. 5th ASIS SIG/CR 
Classification Research Workshop, 139-156. doi:10.7152/acro.v5i1.13783
ISSN: 2324-9773
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 5th ASIS SIG/CR CLASSIFICATION RESEARCH WORKSHOP
believability ratings for the no-context propositions, regardless of testing time. This is not
surprising, since the in-context situation (shown in Table 2), involving the age-old nature-nurture
issue, is a particularly controversial one (i.e., oflow systemic coherence; Schank & Ranney, 1992)
compared to the less subtle no-context items. In contrast, there was less agreement regarding the
hypothesis-likeness of no-context propositions (relative to in-context propositions), and effects in
the same direction regarding the construct of evidence (for subjects with some training; i.e.,
novices on the post-test, as well as experts). As a set, these results suggest that context aids the
identification of evidence and hypotheses, but may - for situations of low systemic coherence
(i.e., considerable controversies) - increase the variability of subjects' ratings of the propositions'
believability. Ultimately consistent with this interpretation, pilot studies with experts showed that
(a) assessing the present study's context-bound propositions out of context reduces the observed
reliability of the believability ratings, and (b) employing an in-context situation of high systemic
coherence (i.e., of little controversy) yields higher inter-rater reliability for the construct of
believability than for no-context propositions.
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For no-context propositions, experts showed higher inter-rater reliability for believability, relative
to novices. For in-context statements, experts exhibited less (and essentially zero) reliability on
their believability ratings, relative to novices. Experts were generally more reliable than novices,
as a group, on ratings of hypothesis-likeness. Finally, novices were as reliable as experts on their
ratings of evidence-likeness, although this was not initially the case for in-context propositions.
Individual differences in ratings ofthe three constructs. Figure 3 shows that both experts
and novices varied considerably in their approaches to rating the provided propositions. For
instance, one novice's initial (no-context) evidence-hypothesis correlation was about -.9, while
another's was about.8; even on the post-test, different novices' correlations (e.g., for believability-
hypothesis) yielded ranges of more than 1.5 for three of the six relevant distributions - i.e., the
distributions for the no-context propositions. In general, these results mirror many of those
mentioned above, as tighter distributions were observed for propositions rated both in context and
after training; for instance, the subjects' believability-evidence correlations ranged only from about
r =.4 to about r =1.0.
Most instructive, perhaps, are the experts' data. As a group, their correlational distributions had
surprisingly wide ranges - sometimes wider than those of the novices. Here again, context seemed
to narrow the range of the correlations. As was the case with somewhat fewer novices (especially
on their post-test), some experts demonstrated little or no variation for ratings of certain constructs
under certain conditions. These were often for principled reasons, even if the principles varied as
a function of context and were idiosyncratic with respect to the other subjects, including other
experts (cf. Ranney, 1994a). For instance, across the no-context propositions, a philosophy
professor rated all propositions as the intermediate "5" on (only) the evidence scale, while across
the in-context propositions, the same subject rated (only) their believability consistently as "5." In
contrast, another expert rated all in-context propositions as "9" on the believability dimension -
that is, as completely believed or accepted.
An interesting case study involves a philosopher of science who rated all no-context propositions
as a "1" ("definitely not evidence") on the evidence scale. In a retrospective interview, he explained
that the propositions often struck him as "facts" (or sometimes statements of methods), rather than
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evidence. ills distinction (echoed somewhat by two other experts) was that, by the time something
is afact, it is rather theory-independent- while evidence counts either for or against a theory. Only
one other subject (a novice) showed this data pattern, though, and there certainly seem to be
situations in which "facts" are not theory-independent (see the Discussion below).
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Other subjects were "outliers" in the observed distributions due to near-invariant and/or
idiosyncratic responding. For instance, one expert (a professor of cognitive psychology) rated
context propositions so highly as hypotheses that his evidence- and believability-hypothesis
correlations were about 1.1 and .45 higher than those of the next-highest expert, similar to the
patterns of some novices. Upon reflectiol!, the expert indicated that, for various imagined
scenarios, almost any statement could be viewed as a (perhaps wild or misinformed) hypothesis or
"prediction," including the statement, "Abraham Lincoln said that Ross Perot would lose in 1992."
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Pilot studies with experts - e.g., involving the testing, at different times, of our in-context
propositions without their story context (randomly ordered among other unrelated, isolated
propositions) - in conjunction with some of the aforementioned data, indicate that even those that
considered or employed principled ways ofresponding often did so inconsistently (but see Ranney,
1994a and 1994b, for some caveats on metrics of consistency). For instance, in an apparent reversal
of his organizing principle, the cognitive psychologist described in the preceding paragraph
exhibited rather negative correlations between hypothesis-likeness and the other two constructs
during. the first pilot study - regardless of context. Further, re-testing with a modified corpus of
statements appeared to modulate (in this case, considerably reduce) the number of experts who
responded in the "principled" fashions described above.
Novices
Pre-test
H-E
H-B
B-E
Post-test
H-E
H-B
B-E
Figure 3. Novices' and experts' correlation distributions. (H-E, H-B, and B-E refer to
hypothesis-evidence, hypothesis-believability, and believability-evidence correlations,
respectively.)
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ar > 0, p<.05; bsignificant increase from novice's pretest, p<.05;
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Pre-test mean Mean changes
score (3 points from pre-test Inter-rater reliability
Definition possible) to post-test (between 5 coders)
hypotheses 2.10 + 0.13 .39a
evidence 2.11 + 0.16 .34a
fact 2.04 + O.44b .14a
explanation 2.08 - 0.04 .35a
contradiction 2.32 + 0.10 .12
theory 1.77 + 0.13 .34a
argument 1.97 + 0.39b .37a
confmnation bias 0.88 + 1.59b .55a
disconfmnation 0.68 + 1.50b .67a
recency bias 0.14 + 2.49b .62a
primacy bias 0.00 + 2.32b .21a
Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994
DISCUSSION
Convince Me seems successful at improving novices' abilities to discriminate between the notions
of evidence and hypothesis, as shown by their more negative correlations following training, as
well as correlations involving believability that suggest that subjects take a largely positivistic
approach. In accord with these findings, Table 6 presents some representative (albeit seemingly
brochure-like) comments from the exit questionnaires of each of the ten subjects who used the
curriculum with Convince Me.
Experts' Ratings of Novice's Definitions
Experts had considerable variety in what they considered good definitions of fact, evidence, theory,
and hypothesis (as generated by novices), as their respective inter-rater reliabilities were r =.14,
.34, .34, and .39. (Inter-rater reliabilities for rating definitions of explanation, contradiction, and
argument were in a similar range; the agreement for "contradiction" was not even statistically
significantly above zero.) In contrast, inter-rater reliabilities for rating (novices') definitions of less
common terms were generally higher (e.g., .55 to .67 for the notions of confirmation bias, recency
bias, and disconfirmation, although only .21 for primacy bias). Table 5 displays these results, as
well as novices' improvements regarding their definitions of the various terms - over half of
which are statistically significant. (The novices' mean improvement and mean ultimate
performance regarding "recency bias" seem most exceptional.)
Table 5. Novices' mean pre-test definition scores, post-test change, and intercoder reliability
correlations between five (expert) coders.
The presence of a context also generally heightened the evidence-hypothesis distinction for our
subjects (although experts seemed less positivistic across in-context propositions than the novices
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Table 6. A sample of subjects' comments about the system employing Convince Me.
150
2
4
5
3
Comment
It's fun. you can change your arguments and evidence to make the computer
see your point ofview...The computer helped me create the arguments, I liked
having the structure, it made it easier to make the connections.. ] always
thought it was pretty clear what a hypothesis or piece of evidence was, that it
was a pretty formal thing. I was surprised how fuzzy they actually are.. .!f
you'd asked me before the test I would have thought distinguishing
hypotheses from evidence would have been an easy task, I was surprised that
it wasn't....But it got easier after using the program.
I enjoyed it, especially doing the tests and using Convince Me. I think I did a
lot better on the post-test, things were a lot clearer in my mind, I liked
reflecting on my thinking.. ] think I did better on the last test mostly because
of using the program.
I learned a lot about what's needed to make a good argument--it's pretty
tough!
I liked to see how the argument was interpreted. I learned how to formulate an
argument, how to organize evidence and hypotheses to tell me something.
The program made clearer for me the way I think, also made clearer for me
what a strong logical argument needs. I learned that some things I believe
strongly in, I cannot argue well, and I have a confirmation bias.
6 It's int~resting to find out how my ratings compared to the computer's.
7 Really illustrates logic processes and makes you see the holes in arguments. I
really liked Convince Me.
8 It was ,a break from writing. I got to see some feedback.
9 It was neat to see a program that related all of my ideas.
10 Kinda fun. Helped define thinking. Learned about computer model, how "it"
thinks people think. Learned how to form arguments, convince the computer,
helped make my thinking more precise and clear.
became). Such results are in concert with those of Ranney et al. (1993) and Schank and Ranney.f
(1991), which indicate that context-embedded propositions designed to appear evidence-like ar'"'
indeed viewed as more believable than propositions designed to appear hypothesis-like. These .';
findings support the Theory of Explanatory Coherence (TEC) and the ECHO model, and seem td
contrast with views suggesting that belief evaluation is more likely to proceed top-down, with!,
hypotheses recruiting either evidence or driving theory assessment (e.g., see Mangan & Palmer,']'
1989). Although some aspects of positivism have fallen into relative disrepute in philosophiCal',;
circles, people seem to act in accordance with TEe's principle ofdata priority, by which - all othe)
things being equal- people are more likely to accept evidence than hypotheses.
Ranney, Schank, Hoadley & Neff
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Table 7. Some factors that appear to influence a proposition's classification as a hypothesis or
piece of evidence.
To appreciate the difficulty of categorizing even fairly straightforward propositions, consider one
of our no-context stimuli, "President John F. Kennedy was assassinated." Many subjects see this
as a piece of evidence. For them, the statement is essentially an observation, much like, "This rose
is red." In contrast, our philosopher of science saw the proposition as a (nonevidential) fact, a
context-free proposition. Yet another interpretation is that it is largely a hypothesis, as the cognitive
psychologist maintained. Indeed, there is much to recommend the "hypothesis" perspective. If it
were truly a context-free fact, then one could not envision scenarios in which the statement were
false. But there are some who truly believe that (a) the victim was Kennedy's double, (b) Kennedy
survived the shooting, and/or (c) the event was an elaborate suicide. One can envision for nearly
any statement a possible situation in which that statement is untrue or in doubt. So, for such
theorists, the statement does appear hypothetical; for one to take it as a domain-independent fact is
Ranney, Schank, Hoadley & Neff151
• the proposition's rhetorical role
• the proposition's believability
• the proposition's consistency with other beliefs
• the proposition's grain size of observation
• the proposition's relative "authority-based" level
• the subject's doubt/skepticism
• the subject's "epistemology du jour"
• the subject's inferences about background context or implicit justifications (i.e., "other"
knowledge)
• the subject's creativity in recontextualizing or envisioning alternatives
• the subject's use ofrule-based/1ogico-deductive reasoning vs. prototypicality-, exemplar- or
mental-model-based reasoning
• the subject's emotional involvement
• the subject's view about what counts as a primitive observation
• the degree to which the subject is a reductionist
That being said, it is perhaps most striking that our results show that it is difficult to determine
whether a given statement represents a hypothesis or a piece of evidence. Even for experts, and
even for propositions embedded in the context of a story, the inter-rater evidence-likeness
agreement was only .42; inter-rater reliability for the hypothesis-likeness construct was only .54.
Hence, we might contrast these findings with Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's pornography
comment (from 1964): "I may not be able to define it, but I know it when I see it!" Regarding
evidence and hypothesis, several grounds suggest that it is unlikely that people truly "know one
when they see one." For one reason, our data indicate that there is great variability even when
experts are asked to classify the propositions. For another reason, the task is clearly difficult, often
involving much rumination, considerable revision, and conscious reflection before subjects decide
upon ratings for a given statement. Furthermore, the consistency of such ratings does not seem to
be high across retesting and changes in context (as is often the case; cf. Ranney, 1994a, 1994b).
Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994
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The definitional rating data further support the above interpretations, as experts' ratings for novices'
definitions of both hypothesis and evidence agreed below r =.4 (and only .14 for "fact"). It appears
that, not only do we not necessarily know a hypothesis (or piece ofevidence) when we see it - we
may not even be able to agree upon a good definition of it when we see one.
152
Thus, apparent distinctions between evidence, facts, and hypotheses often appear more clear in th ..
abstract than for concrete cases. "Theory-independent facts" often just mean "statements that are,
part of already-accepted theories" (e.g., "humans are a kind of animal"). What seems like a fact to'
20th century science would likely be a hypothesis - perhaps even heresy - to other people or our'
own ancestors. Hence, humans-as-animals is only a fact within a class of (sub)theories, so here
again context carries the load of what is "indisputable." Indeed, this helps explain why our rating'
tasks, particularly for evidence and hypotheses, pose such difficulty. We can easily generate a
dozen or more factors that influence the categorization of a proposition, but most of these involve
aspects of context (see Table 7). Further, most of the context must be filled in by our subjects, even
when the statement is embedded in a story. Contexts seem to merely reduce the space of scenarios
in which a statement may serve, and this space often leaves many potential roles of both the
evidential and hypothetical variety. In this respect, one either tries to mentally compare the relative
likelihood of these two populations of roles, or one uses heuristics to try to find the proposition's
most likely role. Such reasoning is similar to that proposed by Johnson-Laird's (1983) version of
"mental models."
to do so only for a certain class of theories. Ofcourse, one might suggest that this discussion mere
turns on some trivial semantic anomaly (e.g., regarding "assassinate"); on the contrary, the data
collected so far suggest that these considerations are also those of our subjects. Indeed, these thr
divergent responses (i.e., evidence vs. fact vs. hypothesis) were recently independently elicited.
from (and respectively explained by) each of three Japanese cognitive scientists (who collaborat
with one another on related topics) - for the very same statement. (Similar discussions with
attorneys about these notions have yielded similar confusions.) How many of us actually "saw"
"observed" Kennedy's shooting (cf. Hanson, 1958/1965)? It seems fairly clear that people create
their own private contexts for such items, in concert with various findings from classification
research.
Ranney, Schank, Hoadley & Neff
Some have suggested that intensively training subjects (e.g., over several years) to methodically
analyze and/or diagram "formal" arguments may be a way of getting them to reason more
effectively. But formal arguments (depending on how one defines them) generally include much
more in the way of logical implication and contradiction (as well as more direct sorts of
classification; cf. Rosch, 1983). In contrast, the sort of argumentation that we (and perhaps the
IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
These findings have considerable import for the field of science education. If we ourselves, as
cognitive scientists, cannot readily and reliably label some notions as "evidence" and others as
"hypothesis," how can we expect students to be terribly concerned about the distinction? Why
should so many science textbooks start with descriptions of this distinction - or imply that the
distinction is clear and apparent to experts? It would seem that there must be better - and more
accurate - ways to both structure science instruction and portray the work of scientists.
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Convince Me and its associated paradigm improved novices' relatively deficient ability to
discriminate between evidence and hypotheses, beyond the benefits of contextual embeddedness.
This would appear to be an encouraging sign for developers of systems of this sort (cf. Cavalli-
CONCLUSIONS
Returning to our earlier empirical motivations, it appears that classifications are clearly modulated
by the context of the to-be-classified entity, as well as the experiences and knowledge of the
classifier. Training, as reified in our system, is also capable of significantly and rapidly moving
novices toward the ranks of expert classifiers. The above measures of intra-classifier and inter-
classifier concordance reinforce these generalizations.
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Regarding diagrammatic representations, it may well be that some sort of graphical representation
of one's argument will either improve one's ability to reason coherently or classify propositions
epistemically. Studies currently under way in our laboratory are addressing these questions, but
both apriori analyses and preliminary evidence suggest that individual aptitudes and predilections
will largely determine whether such graphics (e.g., of the sort shown in part of Figure 2) prove to
be usefully synergistic representations or interfering rhetorical exercises. We can readily envision
both potential benefits and dangerous biases arising from the use of either diagrammatic or textual!
statement-based representations of arguments (Diehl, Ranney, & Schank, in preparation). In other
words, it is not yet clear - for the cognitive domain of evaluating controversial systems of beliefs
- which representations will be most reasoning-congruent for which subpopulations ofpeople (cf.
reasoning-congruence and various representations in the depiction of computer programs; e.g.,
Ranney & Reiser, 1989; Reiser, Ranney, Lovett, & Kimberg, 1989; Reiser, Copen, Ranney, Hamid,
& Kimberg, 1994).
classification research community) find more intriguing is that of "loose reasoning" (Ranney, in
press), involving a complex of competing and supportive propositions that are generally neither
absolutely implicative nor mutually exclusive in their relationships. Others have suggested that
even less formal philosophical arguments, but those still largely dealing in the trade of premises
and conclusions, may provide a more compelling model for the training of analyzers of arguments.
But to suggest that even highly trained philosopher-logicians will be better at classifying premises
and conclusions (in analogy to evidence and hypotheses), one must negate both some of the present
(e.g., expert) findings, as well as much of the contentiousness found in the literatures of such
philosophers. (E.g., many philosophical debates hinge on differing views of what are an argument's
premises and conclusions - and what kind of premise or conclusion a particular proposition
represents.)
More specifically, this study seriously (and empirically) questions the common implication that
classifying evidence and hypotheses is reasonably straightforward once one formally studies
science. On the contrary, it seems that even experts in scientific reasoning - including those who
have studied the distinction themselves - have difficulty articulating data-theory differences. This
seems true in their construct ratings, their inter-expert agreement, and their verbalizations. Further,
although context facilitates the distinction, it by no means entirely obviates the difficulties;
epistemological and semantic differences also cause disagreement about what constitutes
"hypothesis" versus "evidence." In sum, we may not reliably "know one when we see one."
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Sforza, Lesgold, & Weiner, 1992). We may not be able to successfully give students pat definitions
of complex epistemic concepts like theory and evidence, but we might aid their development
through more sophisticated epistemological stages (e.g., Chandler, 1987). In the above, we see that
although even experts disagree on the distinction between theory and data, our reasoner's ' '
workbench certainly makes novices respond more like experts during such epistemic
categorizations.
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